The Illusion of ‘Peace Through Power-Sharing’: Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War

@article{pospieszna2013illusion,
   Author = {Pospieszna, Paulina and Schneider, Gerald},
   Journal = {Civil Wars},
   Number = {sup1},
   Pages = {44--70},
   Publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
   Title = {The Illusion of `Peace Through Power-Sharing': Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War},
   Volume = {15},
   Year = {2013},
   abstract = {Conflict managers around the world cling to the hope that power-sharing decreases the risk of civil war in post-conflict societies. Distinguishing between territorial and governmental conflicts, we analyse the origin and effectiveness of power-sharing institutions (PSI) and power-sharing arrangements (PSA). Our examination reveals that power-sharing is largely a consequence of the institutional legacy and of the war outcome. While PSI such as proportional representation or federalism cannot prevent a war from recurring, PSA in the form of grand coalitions reduces this risk marginally. However, granting autonomy to a rebellious region increases the danger that the relationship with the government turns violent again. Our results suggest that constitution makers should advocate power-sharing with caution.},
   doi = {10.1080/13698249.2013.850877},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2013.850877}
}